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Winters Doctrine Rights
Keystone of National Programs for Western Land
and Water Conservation and Utilization
William H. Veeder*
INTRODUCTION
Every western state in which there are situated Indian reservations,
national forests, parks, and similar areas, has a large stake in preserving
the principles of the Winters Doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court
in 1908.1 Since its pronouncement those who seek to strip the Indians of
their invaluable rights to the use of water and invade the "reserved
rights" of the United States, have attacked the Doctrine by attempting to
construe it away or limit its operation. This paper is a consideration of
the most recent events in the history of that Doctrine.
Briefly, the Supreme Court in declaring the Winters Doctrine, held
that although not mentioned in the treaties, executive orders or other
means used to establish the reservations, there is an implied reservation
of rights to the use of the waters in streams which rise upon, traverse or
border upon Indian reservations, which may be exercised in connection
with the Indian lands. Those rights to the use of water are withheld
from appropriation by others subsequent to their reservation. A 1939
ruling by the Court recognized that Winters Doctrine Rights passed to the
successors in interest of lands to which those rights are appurtenant.2
In 1956 Judge Walter L. Pope, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., ruled that the
Doctrine includes rights to provide for the "ultimate needs of the Indians. ' '3
More recently the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, affirming the
principles of the Ninth Circuit, decided that the implied reservation "was
intended to satisfy the future as well as the present [water] needs of the
Indian Reservations."'4 In the same decision, the Court declared the prin-
ciples of the Winters Doctrine are likewise applicable to reserved lands of
the United States withdrawn for national forests, parks, recreational areas
and wildlife refuges. 5 Even more recently, Judge Pope, again speaking
*LL.B., University of Montana School of Law, 1934. Since graduation Mr. Veeder
has been directly involved in litigation, legislation and administration of rights to
the use of water in Western United States. Most of that period has been in the
United States Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are those of the
writer and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice or any
other agency or department of the federal government.
'Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
'United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
"United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1956).
'373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
UId. at 601.
1
Veeder: Winters Doctrine Rights Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and Utilization
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1964
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for the Ninth Circuit, declared that the Winters Doctrine Rights are re-
served for the "beneficial" use of the Indians.6
The importance of the Winters Doctrine in the last half of the twen-
tieth century cannot be minimized. It is clearly the keystone of the na-
tional programs for land and water conservation. The succeeding para-
graphs analyze the source of title, the nature of and the authority to
exercise the Winters Doctrine Rights.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
To better effectuate the analysis of the Winters Doctrine Rights these
specific questions are presented:
1. What is the date when title to the "reserved rights to the use
of water" became vested in the United States or the Indians,
based upon the Winters Doctrine?
2. What is the legal nature and measure of the Winters Doctrine
Rights, title to which resides in the United States or in the In-
dians?
3. How do the Winters Doctrine Rights compare with appropria-
tive, riparian or prescriptive rights under the laws of the
several states?
The response to these questions entails a review of the basic and far-
reaching principles upon which the Winters Doctrine is predicated and the
manner in which it can be applied.
MONTANA'S INDIAN DECISION DECLARING WINTERS
DOCTRINE-PROTECTS INDIANS AND IS A BASIS FOR
NATIONAL POLICY RESPECTING LAND AND
WATER RESOURCES
The most crucial single opinion relating to the rights to the use of
water claimed and exercised by the United States involved Montana's
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. That case concerned the Indian's
rights and interests in the Milk River and the conflicting claims of non-
Indians who predicated their rights upon Montana law. The principal
matter for resolution by the Supreme Court was whether, when the lands
were set aside for the Indians, there were reserved rights to the use of
water from the Milk River. That query was of particular importance be-
cause no mention was made of rights to the use of water when the lands
constituting the reservation were withdrawn.
Having summarized the issues, the Supreme Court stated: "The
case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 1888, resulting in the
6United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 330 F.2d 897, 915 (9th Cir. 1964),
petition for rehearing denied, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. pending.
[Vol. 26,
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creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation. . . ."I In rejecting contentions
that rights to the use of water were not reserved for the Indians, it fur-
ther stated:
The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically
valueless. And yet, it is contended, the means of irrigation were
deliberately given up by the Indians and deliberately accepted
by the Government. The lands ceded were,, it is true, also arid;
and some argument may be urged, and is urged, that with their
cession there was a cession of the waters, without which they
would be valueless, and "civilized communities could not be
established thereon." And this, it is further contended, the In-
dians knew, and yet made no reservation of the waters. We
realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which
makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than
that which makes for their cession.8
Turning to the assertions that rights claimed pursuant to state law
would take precedence over those of the Indians, the Supreme Court
also declared:
The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt
them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and
could not be.... That the Government did reserve them we have
decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued
through years.9
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Winters Doctrine. Since that
pronouncement there have been numerous decisions throughout the West-
ern United States reiterating the Winters Doctrine and applying it to
speific factual situations.10
In the Ahtanum decision, Judge Pope placed the "reserved rights" in
their proper perspective when he declared, "that the paramount right of
the Indians . . . was not limited to the use of the Indians at any given
date but this right extended to the ultimate needs of the Indians. . .. "I'
Adopting the rationale of the Ahtanum case the Special Master in Arizona
v. California stated: "I have concluded that reservations of water by the
United States included enough to supply expanding needs regardless of
state water law.' 12 The Supreme Court in affirming the Special Master,
approved this concept: "We also agree with the Master's conclusion as to
the quantity of water intended to be reserved. He found that the water
7Winters v. United States, supra note 1, at 575.
sIbid.
Old. at 577.
"See e.g., United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Investment
Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation
Dist., supra note 3.
"United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., supra note 3, at 327.
nRIPKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 261-262 (1961).
1965]
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was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the
Indian Reservations."' 3
WINTERS DOCTRINE APPLIED TO NATIONAL FORESTS,
WILDLIFE REFUGES AND RECEATIONAL AREAS 14
The report of the Special Master in Arizona v. California emphasized
the principle that:
[I] n the Winters case the United States exercised its power to
reserve water by a treaty; but the power itself stems from the
United States' property rights in the water, not from the treaty
power. Since the United States has the power to reserve water,
by treaty, against appropriation under state law, there is no rea-
son why it lacks the power to do so by statute or executive order.'
(Emphasis supplied.)
Too great a stress can not be placed upon the concept thus expressed,
that the "property rights in the water" are the source of the power to
"reserve" those rights. The crux of the entire matter does not turn upon
some regulatory authority as that term is generally used in regard to
interstate commerce. Rather it turns upon the investiture of title in the
central government. The nature of those "reserved rights" and the date
of the investiture of that title are most important features of this con-
sideration.
Adhering to the above-quoted concept, the Special Master viewed
the variety of claims asserted by the United States in Arizona v. Califor-
nia. The first of those claims related to the Gila National Forest. In his
report the Special Master alluded to the fact that the United States
claimed rights to water from sources within the drainage area of the
Gila River System for use in national forests. 6
The finding is warranted that the United States intended, when
it withdrew this Forest from entry, to reserve the water neces-
sary to fulfill the purposes for which the Forest was created....
The power of the United States to make such a reservation with
respect to the Forest cannot be logically differentiated from the
power of the United States with respect to Indian Reserva-
tions. .. .17
Reflective of this same thinking are comparable statements of the Special
Master regarding other areas reserved by the national government from
the "public lands" for use by all of the citizens of this country: "I con-
"Arizona v. California, supra note 4, at 600.
4See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 12, at 254 for a resume' of tile
rights of the United States in connection with its national forests, wildlife refuges
and recreational areas in the lower basin of the Colorado River.
R
5
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elude that the United States had the power to reserve water in the Colo-
rado River for use in the Lake Mead National Recreation Area for the
same reasons that it could reserve such water for Indian Reservations.' 8
As to wildlife refuges established in furtherance of the objectives
of treaties with Mexico and Great Britain, the Special Master likewise
declared:
I have previously concluded that the United States had the
power to reserve unappropriated water in the Colorado River for
the future requirements of the Indian Reservations and a Na-
tional Recreation Area and I can perceive no material distinction
between them and wildlife refuges.19
In adopting the legal reasoning of the Special Master the Supreme
Court first turned to the sources of constitutional power from which
stems the nation's authority to administer its properties. It stated:
Arizona's contention that the Federal Government had no
power, after Arizona became a State, to reserve waters for the
use and benefit of federally reserved land rests largely upon
statements in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan .. .and Shively v. Bowl-
by. . . . They [the cases] do not determine the problem before
us and cannot be accepted as limiting the broad powers of the
United States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce
Clause and to regulate government lands under Art. IV, § 3, of
the Constitution. We have no doubt about the power of the
United States under these clauses to reserve water rights for its
reservations and its property.20
The Supreme Court then reiterated and reaffirmed the Winters Doc-
trine,21 and stated that these rights "having vested before the [Boulder
Canyon Project] Act became effective on June 25, 1929, are 'Present
perfected rights'.. .. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)
In these terms the Winter Doctrine was extended to other reservations
created by the national government out of lands to which it holds title:
The Master ruled that the principle underlying the reserva-
tion of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable
to other federal establishments such as National Recreation Areas
and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions of the
Master that the United States intended to reserve water sufficient
for the future requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation
Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial
l1d. at 292.
"1Id. at 297.
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National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest.23 (Em-
phasis supplied.)
It is impossible to perceive a more far-reaching construction of the prin-
ciples of the Winters Doctrine.
SOURCES OF TITLE OF, AUTHORITY OVER AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF, RIGHTS TO THE USE OF -WATER
OWNED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
A. RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY
Rights to the use of water reserved by the United States are interests
in real property. 24 Rules governing'the sale and transfer of real estate
are equally applicable to the conveyance of rights to the use of water. As
stated by Well in 1 Water Rights in the Western United States, "The con-
veyance must be in writing, as of an interest in real estate within the
statute of frauds. '25 The Supreme Court, in keeping with these prin-
ciples, has declared that unappropriated rights to the use of water to
generate electricity are rights in real property.26
The date of the investiture of title is the prime element in the value
of any right to the use of water in the semi-arid West, whether acquired
by the sovereign pursuant to a treaty or by an individual pursuant to
the local laws. 27 Where the demand so greatly exceeds the supply, the
ownership or control of the legal right first to divert and use water, or
to allow others to use it, is of transcendent importance. It is axiomatic
that he who controls the rights to the use of water likewise controls the
utilization of the land. As a consequence, it is essential to consider the
source of the title and the date of investiture of that title to determine
the scope of the Winters Doctrine Rights.
B. WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY UNITED STATES THROUGH
CESSION FROM INDIANS, FRANCE, MEXICO AND GREAT BRITAIN
Vast areas of lands were ceded by the Indian tribes to the United
States in the western part of this country. The nature of the transfer
from the Indians to the national government is well stated by the Su-
preme Court in these terms: "The treaty [between the Yakimas and the
United States] was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
rights from them-a reservation of those not granted. '2s The Ahtanum
-"Id. at 601.
211 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES §§ 18, 283, 285 (3d ed.
1911).
1Id. at § 542.
"United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73 (1913); Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1936).
'
7Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 34 Pac. 278 (1893) ; See also Whitmore v. Murray
City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (1944).
'United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
[Vol. 26,
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decision relied upon by the Special Master in Arizona v. California,2
has this to say:
That the Treaty of 1855 reserved rights in and to the waters
of this stream for the Indians, is plain from the decision in
Winters v. United States. . .. 30 'The treaty was not a grant of
rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them-a reserva-
tion of those not granted. . . .' Before the treaty the Indians had
the right to the use not only of Ahtanum Creek but of all other
streams in a vast area. The Indians did not surrender any part of
their right to the use of Ahtanum Creek .... 31 (Emphasis sup--
plied.)
As a consequence it is highly important to keep in the foreground that
the treaties between the United States and the Indian tribes resulted in
both a reservation of the rights to the use of water from the streams
which border upon or traverse their properties and a transfer of the rights
in streams which are not similarly situated.
Treaties with France in 1803 invested the United States with title to
the vast area of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1848, Mexico, by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, conveyed the Southwest to the United States, and
Great Britain, in 1846, ceded to the national government the Pacific
Northwest.32 Each of the cessions passed title, subject to then vested
rights, to all of the lands and rights to the use of water which were part
and parcel of them.3 3 By those cessions not only the title but complete
jurisdiction in the fullest legal sense passed to the central government
over "all lands, lakes [and] rivers. . . .,,4
C. HISTORY OF WESTERN DEVELOPMENT UNDERSCORES OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL BY UNITED STATES OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER ON ITS
PUBLIC LANDS
Here it is essential to establish the difference between the "public
lands" and "reservations" of the United States. The Supreme Court has
stated that "'public lands' are lands subject to private appropriation and
disposal under public land laws ;,,35 whereas, " 'reservations' are not so
subject. '36 The Court has also declared: "It is a familiar principle of
public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of the
public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly sub-
REPORT OP THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 12, at 258, 261.
5 United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., supra note 3, at 325.
81Id. at 326.
11 WEL, op. cit. supra note 24, § 66.
'See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 453 (1878); California-Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935); Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 95
Pac. 732 (1908), 98 Pac. 1083 (1909), 102 Pac. 728 (1909).
3'VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 120 (1883). Full import of the legal aspects of the investi-
ture of complete title in the United States is reviewed at length by the Supreme
Court in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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ject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some
other purpose."3 7
To a large extent the history of the West constitutes a review of the
manner in which the principles of western water law became established.
It likewise evidences the relationship between the national government
and the pioneers who went upon the "public lands" and formulated those
principles. In that connection Weil has correctly stated:
The law of prior appropriation of water originated among
the miners of California in the earliest days of that State. .... 3.
Under the theory upon which the law of appropriation arose,
and what is still the theory of the California doctrine, several
appropriators on the same stream upon public land . . . bear
to each other the relation of successive grantees of parcels of
one original holding, namely, of the sole right to the waters held
by the United States as original owner. Like successive grants
between private parties, where they conflict, the later one can
hold only what was left after the earlier one was made. 39
The thought expressed in this excerpt is twofold: (1) title to the appro-
priative right to the use of water upon the public domain stems from
the United States, and (2) the "priority date" establishes the relationship
between successive holders of appropriative rights on the public lands all
of whose rights stemmed from the national government.40
From the leading case of Jennison v. Kirk,41 further insight can be
gained into the history of the doctrine of prior appropriation. There it
is pointed out:
For eighteen years-from 1848 [the date of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo] to 1866-the regulations and customs of
miners, as enforced and moulded by the courts and sanctioned
by the legislation of the State, constituted the law governing
property in mines and in water on the public mineral lands.42
[And those laws] recognized discovery, followed by appropria-
tion, as the foundation of the possessor's title, and development
by working as the condition to its retention .... The first appro-
priator was everywhere held to have, within certain well-defined
limits, a better right than others to the claims taken up; and in
all controversies, except as against the government .... But the
mines could not be worked without water. . . . To carry water
7United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938).
's1 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 24, § 66.
'1 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 24, § 299.
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to mining localities . . . became, therefore, an important and
necessary business in carrying on mining. Here, also, the first
appropriator of water to be conveyed to such localities for min-
ing or other beneficial purposes, was recognized as having, to the
extent of actual use, the better right.4 3
Applying those principles of local law-in the light of the Act of 1866-
the Court concluded:
[T]he owner of a mining claim and the owner of a water-right
enjoy their respective properties from the dates of their appro-
priation, the first in time being the first in right; but where both
rights can be enjoyed without interference with or material im-
pairment of each other, the enjoyment of both is allowed.44
(Emphasis supplied.)
As Congress had not authorized acquisition of rights to the use of
water, there was no law other than that which grew up among the
miners. To correct this situation Congress adopted the Act of 1866 which
provides:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of
water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes,
have vested and accrued, and the same recognized and acknowl-
edged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the
possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained
and protected in the same .... 45
This statute has been adjudged by the Supreme Court to have this effect:
The object of the section was to give the sanction of the
United States, the proprietor of the lands, to possessory rights,
which had previously rested solely upon the local customs, laws,
and decisions of the courts, and to prevent such rights from be-
ing lost on a sale of the lands. 46
[T]he general purpose of the Act [of 1866] . . .was to give
sanction of the government to possessory rights acquired under
the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts. 47
Subsequently, Congress adopted the Desert Land Act of 1877, which
declared in connection with settlers on the "public land" that "the right
to the use of water .. . shall depend upon bona fide prior appropria-
tion . . . [leaving all 'surplus water' over and above that actually appro-
priated] free for the appropriation and use of the public. .... ,,48
"Id. at 457-58.
"Id. at 461.
'514 STAT. 253 (1866), as amended, 43 U.S.C. 661 (1958). See Jennison v. Kirk, supra
note 33, at 456.
"Jennison v. Kirk, supra note 33, at 456-57.
"
7Id. at 461.
"Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 STAT. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 321 (1958).
1965)
9
Veeder: Winters Doctrine Rights Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and Utilization
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1964
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Further light is thrown upon the historical development of western
water law by the case of Lux v. Haggin, in which the court stated:
By the Treaty [of Guadalupe Hidalgo] the public property of
Mexico passed to the United States.49
[F]rom a very early day the courts of this state [California]
have considered the United States government as the owner of
such running waters on the public lands of the United States.
... Recognizing the United States as the owner of the lands and
waters, and as therefore authorized to permit the occupation
and diversion of the waters as distinct from the lands, the state
courts have treated the prior appropriator of water on the public
lands of the United States as having a better right than a subse-
quent appropriator, on the theory that the appropriation was
allowed or licensed by the United States.50
Concurrence with those concepts is to be found in California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.: "As the owner of the public
domain, the government possessed the power to dispose of land and
water thereon together, or to dispose of them separately."' In regard
to the lands and rights to the use of water ceded to the national government
in the arid West, the Supreme Court in the same case declared:
Congress intended to establish the rule that for the future [after
1877] the land should be patented separately; and that all non-
navigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the
public under the laws of the states and territories named. 2
The full importance of this language can be understood only after a
consideration of the Montana federal district court decision of Howell v.
Johnson,53 which was relied upon by the Court. At issue in the Howell
case was the source of title to claimed rights to divert and utilize waters
from a stream flowing over and across the "public lands" of the United
States. In answer to this question the court stated:
The rights of plaintiff do not, therefore, rest upon the laws
of Wyoming, but upon the laws of congress.
The legislative enactment of Wyoming was only a condition
which brought the law of congress into force. The national gov-
ernment is the proprietor and owner of all the land in Wyoming
and Montana which it has not sold or granted to some one com-
petent to take and hold the same. Being the owner of these
lands, it [the United States] has the power to sell or dispose of
"Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pae. 674, 719 (1886).
T Id. at 721.
T Supra note 33, at 162.
uIbid.
089 Fed. 556 (D. Mont. 1898).
[Vol. 26,
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any estate therein or any part thereof. The water in an innavig-
able stream flowing over the public domain is a part thereof, and
the national government can sell or grant the same, or the use
thereof, separate from the rest of the estate, under such condi-
tions as may seem to it proper.54
In rendering the California-Oregon Power Co. decision, the Supreme
Court not only relied upon the Montana case of Howell v. Johnson, but
likewise cited as authoritative the "well reasoned" Oregon decision of
Hough v. Porter55 which compared the power of the national government
to grant rights to the use of water upon its lands with that exercised
in its disposition of mineral rights upon those lands. The Hough case
relied upon another Oregon decision which stated:
[T]he waters of non-navigable streams are part of such public
domain, and hence the property of the government, which may
lay hold of and use them, without taking any of the steps made
necessary to obtain a usufructuary interest therein by private
individuals. 56
Simply stated, the California-Oregon Power Co. decision recognized
that Congress permitted the states to decide the manner in which there
could be acquired, and the character of the title to, rights to the use of
water which would pass from the national government into private
ownership. That principle was, as has been observed, applicable to "pub-
lic lands." In regard to the acquisition of title from the United States
through compliance with state law the Supreme Court said in the Cali-
fornia-Oregon Power Co. opinion:
[F]ollowing the act of 1877 . . . all non-navigable waters then a
part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the
plenary control of the designated states . . . with the right in
each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropria-
tion or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should
obtain. . . . The Desert Land Act does not bind or purport to
bind states to any policy. It simply recognizes and gives sanc-
tion, in so far as the United States and its future grantees are con-
cerned, to the state and local doctrine of appropriation. ... 57
(Emphasis in part supplied.)
This statement makes clear that the source of the title to rights appro-
priated upon the "public lands" is the United States. Equally manifest
is that the unappropriated rights to the use of water which are part and
parcel of the "reserved" lands are not open to private acquisition.58
"Id. at 558.
'Supra note 33.
'Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 30 Ore. 59, 104, 45 Pac. 472, 484-85 (1896).
57California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 33, at 163-64.
'See FP0 v. Oregon, supra note 35.
1965]
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D. PRINCIPLES OF WINTERS DOCTRINE LOGICAL SEQUITUR OF BASIC PRECEPTS
OF INTERNATIONAL STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL LAW
From the authorities reviewed above it is manifest that the national
government is empowered by the Constitution to dispose of its public
lands and rights to the use of water which were a part of them, together
or dispose of them separately. In the comments which follow, the power
to "reserve" those rights to the use of water will be considered.
1. Key Decisions
Important in regard to the future administration of the national
government's reserved lands and rights to the use of water is the broad
constitutional basis upon which it is predicated. That freedom to control
the use of its properties is exercisable without regard to state law. "A
different rule would place the public domain of the United States com-
pletely at the mercy of state legislation." 59 For example, the United
States is independent from interference by local governments in the
establishment of national forests6" and the formulation of needful rules
for their administration.6 1 The constitutional source of this authority is
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. When
acting within the purview of that authorization the power of Congress
over reserved lands and rights to the use of water is unlimited. 2
2. Power to "reserve rights"
In the immediately preceding paragraphs the power of the United
States to administer its property has been discussed. The exercise of that
power in connection with the Indians gave rise to the Winters Doctrine
precept that: "The power of the Government to reserve the waters and
exempt them from appropriation under state law is not denied, and could
not be."163 Arizona v. California, further recognized these principles in con-
nection with the national forests and other federal reservations.
WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
DIFFER GREATLY FROM PRIVATE RIGHTS ACQUIRED
PUSUANT TO STATE LAW
To this point certain prime factors of Winters Doctrine Rights of the
United States have been reviewed: (a) title to these rights became in-
vested in the national government when they were ceded to it, and (b)
they were not open to acquisition by private parties. These Winters Doc-
trine Rights, moreover, differ greatly from rights which have been pri-
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897).
"'Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
'United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911).
'United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
"Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
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vately acquired pursuant to the laws of the several states. A brief refer-
ence to some of the more salient characteristics of the last mentioned
rights will demonstrate the differences between those rights and the
Winters Doctrine Rights.
A. WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER ARE NOT RIPARIAN
IN CHARACTER
The doctrine of common law riparian rights to the use of water has
been rejected in the states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, while other western states in varying
degrees do recognize riparian rights. California and the other western
states that take cognizance of riparian rights also recognize appropria-
tive rights to the use of water and are referred to as hybrid states.
Examination of the principal characteristics of the riparian doctrine
is thus warranted. Perhaps the prime factor in regard to those rights is
that they are part and parcel of the land and do not exist independently of
it. 64 Moreover, a riparian right is held and exercised correlatively with
all other riparian owners as "a tenancy in common and not a separate or
severable estate." 65 Obviously the concept of the "reserved right" in the
national government is wholly at variance with the limitations which are
present in a tenancy in common. Further, "a riparian owner has no right
to any mathematical or specific amount of the waters of a stream as
against other like owners."66 That aspect of the riparian right results
from the fact that those rights are held correlatively with all other ri-
parians. As a consequence the quantity of water riparian owners may use
must be "reasonable" in the light of the claims of all other riparians.
Reasonableness is, of course, a variant depending upon the supply of
water, the demands which differ from day to day, and a multitude of
other factors.67
Equally at odds with the concept of Winters Doctrine Rights of the
United States is the limitation upon the exercise of rights riparian in
character that: "'Land which is not within the watershed of the river
is not riparian thereto, and is not entitled, as riparian land, to the use
or benefit of the water from the river, although it may be part of an
entire tract which does extend to the river . ..' "68 There is, of course, no
legal basis for any limitation of Winters Doctrine Rights to the watershed
in which the government land is situated. Moreover, the laws of the
states could not thus restrict the power of Congress over the properties
of the nation.6 9
"HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 187 (1956).
'Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Great Western Power Co. of California, 209
Cal. 206, 287 Pae. 93, 98 (1930).0 Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405, 410 (1944).
67HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 218.
11Id. at 202.
"United States v. San Francisco, supra note 62.
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B. WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER ARE NOT PRESCRIPT-
IVE IN CHARACTER
There is no basis for asserting that Winters Doctrine Rights were
acquired by the United States through adverse possession. Rather, these
rights were conveyed outright to the national government by the cessions
alluded to above. There are neither facts to sustain, nor any reason for,
an assertion that the federal government has exercised the Winters Doc-
trine Rights in an open, notorious, hostile manner for a period which
would give rise to a claimed right by prescription. Elemental though that
statement may be, it demonstrates the disparity between ceded rights-
Winters Doctrine Rights-and others.
C. WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DIFFER
FROM APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER
The preceding review sets forth the historic development of the doc-
trine of prior appropriation. That doctrine is the outgrowth of the local
laws governing the respective rights of private claimants upon the "pub-
lic land." As stated above "the rights of [appropriations upon public
lands] ... do not, therefore, rest upon the laws of Wyoming, but upon
the laws of congress." 0 "The legislative enactment of [the state] ...
was only a condition which brought the law of congress into force."'"
1. Winters Doctrine Rights Were Ceded, Not Appropriated
Title to the "reserved rights" passed to the United States by cession.
This means of acquiring title differs radically from the requirements for
obtaining title to appropriative rights. As pointed out by the Court in
Arizona v. California:
To appropriate water means to take and divert a specified quan-
tity thereof and put it to beneficial use in accordance with the
laws of the State where such water is found, and, by so doing, to
acquire under such laws, a vested right to take and divert from
the same source, and to use and consume the same quantity of
water annually forever, subject only to the right of prior appro-
priations.7 2
The Supreme Court then concluded with this all-important statement as
to the primary element giving rise to an appropriative right: "[T]he
perfected vested right to appropriate water flowing within the State can-
not be acquired without the performance of physical acts through which
the water is and will in fact be diverted to beneficial use."'7 3 (Emphasis
supplied.)
7 0Howell v. Johnson, supra note 53, at 558.
,California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 33, at 162.
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In a state case the Utah Supreme Court enunciated exactly the same
principles:
Under our laws, rights in and to the use of public waters, or of
a natural stream or source, may be acquired only by appropria-
tion and by an actual diversion of waters from the natural chan-
nel or stream and a beneficial use made of them .... [I]t is an
indisputable requisite that there must be an actual d*_version of the
water from its natural channel into the appropriator's ditch,
canal, reservoir or other structure. 4
These requisites of the investiture of title to an appropriative right
have been listed by the Utah court: "The three principle elements to
constitute a valid appropriation . .. are: (1) an intent to apply it to
some beneficial use; (2) a diversion from the natural channel . . . (3) an
application of it within a reasonable time to some useful industry. '75
Manifestly the "rights reserved" by the United States as recognized under
the Winters Doctrine were ceded to it and need not be-indeed could not be
-appropriated in conformity with the preceding requirements of state
law.
2.. Winters Doctrine Rights Cannot Be Measured in the Manner
Applicable to Appropriative Rights
Winters Doctrine Rights in the words of the Supreme Court, are re-
served for uses "which would be necessarily continued through years"76
and "to satisfy the future as well as the present needs. '7 7 Variances be-
tween the Winters Doctrine Rights and appropriative rights are thus
clearly defined. A "future use" is entirely foreign to the doctrine of ap-
propriation of right. In connection with the appropriation concept in
western water law it has been declared by the Utah Supreme Court that
"beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state."7 8  (Emphasis supplied.) That statement is a
reflection of the statutory law of Utah which declares that "the appro-
priation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose .... -79 In keep-
ing with these tenets the Utah court in the McNaughton decision stated:
"No one can acquire the right to use more water than is necessary, with
reasonable efficiency, to satisfy his beneficial requirements . .. and it
must be used with due diligence."80
It is, however, recognized by the courts that the Indians' rights are
not thus limited for "we deal here with the conduct of the Government
as trustee for the Indians. It is not for us to say to the legislative branch
7"Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 Pao. 194, 199, 72 A.L.R. 657 (1930).
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 1112, 1116 (1910).
,'Winters v. United States, supra note 63, at 577.
17Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
"'MeNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570, 572 (1952).
"OUTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953).
'0McNaughton v. Eaton, supra note 78, at 572.
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of the Government ... .s when those rights are to be exercised. This
principle also prevails in regard to other Winters Doctrine Rights.
3. Winters Doctrine Rights Have Date of Acquisition, Not "Priority
Date" as Term Is Used for Appropriative Rights
The date when the Winters Doctrine Rights were ceded to the United
States is the date of their acquisition. There is no basis in law for claim-
ing a "priority date" for them as is asserted in connection with an appro-
priative right privately acquired pursuant to state law. The national
government, far from being an appropriator of rights to the use of water,
was the source of the title to those rights .8 2 Brief reference to the incep-
tive dates of titles to appropriative rights further demonstrates the basic
differences between those rights and Winters Doctrine Rights.
In its 1936 Arizona v. California decision 3 the Supreme Court suc-
cinctly presented the priority date concept:
The appropriator first in time is prior in right over others upon
the same stream, and the right, when perfected by use, is deemed
effective from the time the purpose to make the appropriation is
definitely formed and actual work upon the project is begun, or
from the time statutory requirements of notice of the proposed
appropriation are complied with, provided the work is carried
to completion and the water is applied to a beneficial use with
reasonable diligence 84 (Emphasis supplied.)
This statement clearly distinguished the appropriation right from the
Winters Doctrine Right ceded to the national government. The United
States is the owner of Winters Doctrine Rights and capable of reserving
them without formulating an intention to divert the water and use it
with reasonable diligence in contemplation of the state law. The Supreme
Court referred to the "perfected" appropriative right becoming vested
when all requirements of intent and overt acts have been completed.
However, the Winters Doctrine Rights were declared by the Court to be
"present perfected rights 's5 by the single act of withdrawing unappro-
priated rights from the operation of the Desert Land Act of 1877 and
related acts. Further review is unnecessary to demonstrate the drastic
and far-reaching difference between Winters Doctrine Rights and those
appropriated pursuant to state law.
D. WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS NOT SUBJECT TO STATE CONTROL-
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPOSSIBILITY
State laws were enacted for the purpose of providing means by
which rights to the use of water may be acquired by the citizens of the
"United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1956).81See text supra at 154-155.
'298 U.S. 558 (1936).
"'Id. at 566.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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states. These laws also provide for the administration of those privately
acquired rights. However, state enactments are not designed or intended
to regulate and control the functions of the national government in the
administration of its Winters Doctrine Rights or of those of the Indians.
Evidence of the conflict which would arise between the official of
the United States empowered to administer Winters Doctrine Rights and
the state official who controls the use of water by private citizens is
demonstrated by a state statute which declares that "no permanent
change shall be made except on the approval of an application therefore
by the state engineer .... 86 The federal official employed to administer
Winters Doctrine Rights must be free from state restraint of that character.
It is most important that there be unrestricted authority to change
the uses made of Winters Doctrine Rights. In this connection the Supreme
Court of the United States declared in regard to Winters Doctrine Rights
within the Yosemite National Park and the Stanislaus National Forest:
Article 4, § 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that 'The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States.' The power over the public
land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.8 7 "And
it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be adminis-
tered. That is for Congress to determine."88 Thus, Congress may
constitutionally limit the disposition of the public domain to a
manner consistent with its views of public policy. And the pol-
icy to govern the disposal of rights to develop hydroelectric
power in such public lands may, if Congress chooses, be one de-
signed to avoid monopoly .... 89
M'-oreover, the congressional power over the public lands and "reserved
rights to the use of water" is not subject "to veto" by the states.90
There is no need on the part of the United States, when it is invested
with title to Winters Doctrine Rights to initiate rights to the use of water
pursuant to state law. As noted state law requires that water must be
diverted and applied to a beneficial use by the appropriator before a
right may be acquired, 91 but the United States does not use the water and
it could not, under state law, acquire rights to it.
The inability of the United States to comply with state law is pointed
up by this declaration of the Utah Supreme Court: "[T]he appropria-
tion must be one that inures to the exclusive benefit of the appropriator
s'UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1963).
s
7United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
slLight v. United States, supra note 60, at 537.
"United States v. San Francisco, supra note 62, at 29-30.
'°FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 445 (1955).
9 See text supra at 155-159.
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and subject to his complete dominion and control. '92 (Emphasis sup-
plied.) It is also manifest that where permittees or licensees enjoy in
common the Winters Doctrine Rights of the United States, as is often the
case when the water on reserved lands is used by private livestock own-
ers who graze the lands, the element of "exclusive" use referrd to in the
preceding quotation is lacking. However, under the Winters Doctrine the
United States is not required to show exclusive use. There is no need
to constitute those who use the waters as agents acting on behalf of the
United States to effectuate an appropriation.
Another example of the disparity between the basic principles which
underlie Winters Doctrine Rights and privately owned appropriation
rights is presented by the statement in Arizona v. California "that the
United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future require-
ments of the ...Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, [and] the Im-
perial Wildlife Refuge .... 93 (Emphasis supplied.)
This position of the Court, recognizing that Winters Doctrine Rights
may be used in development of wildlife refuges, is in direct conflict with
the result reached by the Supreme Court of Utah in a case in which,
under the appropriation theory, an attempt was made to secure water for
similar purposes:
To our minds it is utterly inconceivable that a valid appropria-
tion of water can be made under the laws of this state, [for wild
waterfowl] when the beneficial use of which, after the appropria-
tion is made, will belong equally to every human being who
seeks to enjoy it .... If the beneficial use for which the appro-
priation is made cannot, in the nature of thing, belong to the ap-
propriator, of what validity is the appropriation? The very pur-
pose and meaning of an appropriation is to take that which was
before public property and reduce it to private ownership. The
whole procedure under our statute, relating to an appropria-
tion of water, is a series of steps to that end.
It certainly must be conceded that the purpose of the law is
to endow the appropriator of the water with all the insignia of
private ownership. The certificate is his deed; his evidence of
title, good, at least against the state, for all it purports to be and
good as against every one else who cannot show a superior
right.9 4
The Duck Club case emphasizes the fundamental differences between
the publicly administered Winters Doctrine Rights and those which are
acquired by private individuals for their exclusive use under state law.
Sound principles of constitutional law give rise to these differences. The
9Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309, 311 (1917).
'Supra note 85, at 601.
"Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, supra note 92, at 310-11.
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Supreme Court has declared that if state laws governed the properties
of the United States the result would be to "place the public domain of
the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." 95 The
1930 Arizona v. California decision involved an attempt to impose state
water law controls on the Department of the Interior. In that case the
Court declared: "The United States may perform its functions without
conforming to the police regulations of a state."96
THE SIGNIFICANT DATE OF WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS:
DATE OF CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES
NOT DATE OF RESERVATION
A. CESSION DATE OF WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS Is THE DATE OF
ACQUISITION OF THOSE RIGHTS
Thompson, in his treatise on Real Property states that "in this coun-
try we are to look to the federal government and its grants for the source
of all title to lands .... -97 This statement embraces rights to the use of
water in the Western United States. Consequently, it cannot be as-
serted that title to Winters Doctrine Rights became vested in the United
States on other than the date that the lands upon which they are asserted
were ceded to the United States. July 4, 1848, is the date when Mexico by
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded the rights which were very
largely involved in Arizona v. California.9"
B. DATE OF OPENING SURPLUS WATERS TO ACQUISITION ON "PUBLIC LANDS"
HAS No BEARING ON DATE OF ACQUISITION OF WINTERS DOCTRINE
RIGHTS
As pointed out in Jennison v. Kirk,99 eighteen years were to elapse
between 1848, when the rights involved in Arizona v. California were
acquired by the United States and the year 1866, when congressional
sanction was given to private rights on the public domain claimed pur-
suant to local laws and customs.100 Eleven years more were to elapse
before the Desert Land Act of 1877,101 when surplus waters on the "pub-
lic lands" were made available for acquisition. Those dates are without
significance in regard to the Winters Doctrine Rights. They simply estab-
lish the time when rights to the use of water on "public lands" could
have been acquired pursuant to state laws. Rights which were so
acquired prior to withdrawal of a reservation are, of course, recognized.
O'Camfield v. United States, supra note 59, at 526.
"Arizona v. California, supra note 83, at 451.
975A THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2710 (1957).
9In the lower basin of the Colorado River a small portion of the rights were ceded by
the Gadsden Purchase, 10 STAT. 1031 (1853).
1198 U.S. (8 Otto) 453 (1878).
10014 STAT. 253 (1866), as amended, 43 U.S.C. 661 (1958).
10119 STAT. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 321 (1958).
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C. TITLE TO WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS IN NO WAY RELATED TO DATE OF
"RESERVATION"; THEY WERE SIMPLY No LONGER OPEN TO PRIVATE
ACQUISITION
Neither title to nor the date of acquisition of the Winters Doctrine
Rights of the United States was in any way altered by the fact that they
were reserved by the United States upon creation of the reservation, and
thus no longer subject to private acquisition under the Desert Land Act
of 1877. After the particular reservation was created the rights were
reserved for the Indians or for the benefit of the nation as a whole. It
is clear that withdrawal of the Winters Doctrine Rights cannot be viewed
as the inceptive date of title to them by the United States. Equally
important is this fact: Title to rights to the use of water acquired pur-
suant to the laws of 1866, 1870, and 1877 prior to the withdrawal of "re-
served lands" could not be disturbed by that act of withdrawal by the
United States. From Arizona v. California this statement is taken:
"Winters has been followed by this Court as recently as 1939 in United
States v. Powers .... 102 We follow it now and agree that the United States
did reserve the water rights for the Indians effective as of the time the
Indian Reservations were created."'' 0  Key to that ruling is the term
"effective." What was "effective"? It was the withdrawal of rights to
the use of water acquired by the United States in the year 1848, from
the application of the Desert Land Act of 1877 which had made them
available for private acquisition. Continuing this same subject the Su-
preme Court has stated: "This means . . .that these water rights, having
vested before the Act became effective on June 25, 1929, are 'present per-
fected rights' and as such are entitled to priority under the [Boulder
Canyon Project] Act. °10 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
The nature of these "present perfected rights" is of great inpor-
tance.l05 These rights are "to satisfy the future as well as the present
needs of the Indian Reservations." These needs are to be measured by
the quantity of water necessary "to irrigate all practicably irrigable
acreage on the reservations.' 1 6
The "priority" of the Winters Doctrine Rights thus does not partake of
the "priority date" recognized under the doctrine of prior appropriation.
The inceptive date of title for an appropriative right, as stated in the
1936 Arizona v. California decision is established as follows:
1 2305 U.S. 527 (1939).
"
2Supra note 85, at 600.
'"0Ibid.
1'5The Bouldor Canyon Project Act provides for the approval of the Colorado River
Compact, 45 STAT. 1064 (1920), added by, 49 STAT. 863, (1935), 43 U.S.C. 617 1
(1958). Contained in that Compact are these provisions:
Article VII. Nothing in this Compact shall be construed as affecting the
obligations of the United States of America to Indian Tribes.
Section VIII. Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters
of the Colorado River System are unimparied by this Compact. ...
(Emphasis Supplied.)
'10 Arizona v. California, supra note 85, at 600.
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The appropriator first in time is prior in right over others upon
the same stream, and the right, when perfected by use, is deemed
effective from the time the purpose to make the appropriation is
definitely formed and actual work upon the project is begun ...
provided the work is carried to completion and the water is ap-
plied to a beneficial use with reasonable diligence. 10 7 (Empha-
sis supplied.)
The "reserved rights" of the Indians-their Winters Doctrine Rights
-were not perfected by use. They were acquired by cession. Their with-
drawal was "effective" from th date of reservation. The vast disparity
is thus demonstrated between the meaning of the term "priority" under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act in regard to Winters Doctrine Rights and
the term "priority date" as used in connection with the rights acquired
from the national government through compliance with state law.
Preservation of the unbroken chain of title to the Winters Doctrine
Rights acquired by the United States from the Indians, France, Mexico and
Great Britain, is not less vital to the national government and the Indians
than is preservation of a comparable title to the land of which they are
a part. It was in connection with that unbroken chain of title to Winters
Doctrine Rights that the Supreme Court in the Winters case recognized
the power of the United States to reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under state law. That power, as the Special Master
observed in Arizona v. California, "stems from the United States' prop-
erty rights in the water."'' 08 It was the unbroken chain of title to which
the Court referred in Arizona v. California when it stated:
We . . . agree that the United States did reserve water
rights for the Indians effective as of the time the Indian Reser-
vations were created.
The water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present
needs of the Indian Reservations....
The principle underlying the reservation of water rights for
Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal
establishments such as National Recreation Areas and National
Forests. 0
It is equally clear that, absent ownership of title to the unappropriated
rights on the "effective" date of the reservation, the Court could not
have stated: "We have no doubt about the power of the United States
under these [the property and commerce] clauses [of the Constitution]
to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property."' 10
"'Supra note 83, at 566.
t'RIFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 259 (1961).




Veeder: Winters Doctrine Rights Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and Utilization
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1964
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Even in the exercise of constitutional authority an owner can not
reserve that which he does not own. No mere technicality is here in-
volved, for one of the most valuable aspects of a right to the use of
water is the date when title to it was first vested. That proposition is
equally applicable to Winters Doctrine Rights, appropriative rights or
riparian rights in the hybrid states like California.
Property rights in water consist not alone in the amount
of the appropriations, but also, in the priority of the appropria-
tion. It often happens that the chief value of an appropriation
consists in its priority over other appropriations from the same
natural stream. Hence, to deprive a person of his priority is to
deprive him of a most valuable property right .... "I
Although a priority date is a misnomer in regard to the Winters
Doctrine Rights, nevertheless the right to date their title back to 1848 is
invaluable. If abandoning a state stautory priority would amount to the
loss "of a most valuable property right," then it follows a fortiori that
the failure to claim the date of acquisition of the Winter Doctrine Rights
is a far greater loss. The Winters Doctrine Rights are of indefinitely
greater value than the more limited appropriative rights.
Winters Doctrine Rights to the use of water for Indian reservations
are not limited to purposes of irrigation. Similarly rights to the use of
water on the national forests and grazing districts are not limited to
stock watering purposes as they are now used to a very marked degree.
Rather, when the need arises, they should be available-always subject to
the will of Congress-for the authorized purposes of the United States.1 2
A factor of importance is the measure of the Winters Doctrine Rights.
On sound principle, borne out by the Ahtanum decision and Arizona v.
California, beneficial use has nothing to do with their investiture and their
continued existence. Relative to the measure of the Indian rights in
Arizona v. California the Court had this to say: "We have concluded
... that the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the
reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage. The various acreages
of irrigable land which the Master found to be on the different reserva-
tions we find to be reasonable."' 131 It likewise stated that the United
States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future requirements of
th national forests and other reservations which were involvd. The quan-
tities of Winters Doctrine waters adjudicated to the United States in
Arizona v. California is referred to in the "Decree entered March 9,
1964. "114
The criteria used in Arizona v. California in measuring the Winters
Doctrine Rights are not precedents for measuring other rights of a similar
"'Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (1944).
"
2 United States v. San Francisco, supra note 62, at 29-30.
"Supra note 85, at 601.
14Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
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nature. Those criteria, it must be remembered, were adopted to meet the
exigencies which existed-the Colorado River Compact and the appor-
tionment made to the States under the circumstances which prevailed.
They would not be applicable to a different factual situation and, do not
constitute precedents beyond the purview of that case.
PROTECTION OF THE WINTERS DOCTRINE RIGHTS
OF MONTANA INDIANS
Montana's Crow Indians and other similarly situated reservation
Indians have a direct and vital interest in the manner in which the
Winters Doctrine is applied in connection with their rights. Title to such
rights has been recognized by the Supreme Court to reside in the Crows. 1 5
The Crows, the Fort Belknap and other Indians held title to their Winters
Doctrine Rights antecedent to their treaties. Moreover, the source of their
titles is not the national government. For as Judge Pope pointed out in
regard to the treaty rights of the Yakimas: "The treaty was not a grant
of rights [from the United States] to the Indians, but a grant of right
from them [to the United States and]-a reservation [by the Indians]
of those rights not granted."" 6 Consequently title to the Winters Doc-
trine Rights has been held by them since time immemorial and any effort
to "date" them with a priority, in the sense that term is used under the
doctrine of prior appropriation, would constitute a clear-cut invasion of
the rights of the Indians. Moreover, as stated, the Winters Doctrine
Rights may be exercised for any beneficial purpose and failure to exercise
them does not result in their loss.
CONCLUSION
Winters Doctrine Rights to the use of water are of immense value to
the Indians and to the United States as a whole. They are unique, being
free of the limitations and restraints inherent in the appropriative and
riparian rights acquired by compliance with state law.
Title to the Winters Doctrine Rights resides in the Indians or was
ceded to the United States by treaties with the Indians, France, Great
Britain and Mexico. Date of acquisition of those rights is the time of
the cession. They were conveyed by those treaties as part and parcel of
the land.
There is an unbroken chain of title to the Winters Doctrine Rights in
the United States dating back to the treaties ceding those rights to it.
Severance of that chain of title by claiming a date subsequent to the
treaties would constitute an abandonment of invaluable rights. More-
over, any severance of that chain of title casts doubt on the source of
title, the character, nature and measure of the Winters Doctrine Rights.
"United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1938).
"
6 United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., supra note 81, at 326.
1965]
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Only the unappropriated rights to the use of water on public lands
are open to acquisition. However, these rights and the lands of which
they are a part, when withdrawn from the status of being available for
acquisition, are reserved for the Indians, national forests and other na-
tional reservations. These withdrawals of the Winters Doctrine Rights
had no effect upon the source of title, the date of their acquisition or
their nature or character.
Winters Doctrine Rights were not acquired by use nor are they lost
by non-use. They may be exercised to satisfy the future as well as present
needs. Moreover, Congress has unlimited power as to the purpose for
which they may be exercised. The measure of the rights when adjudi-
cated should be governed by the circumstances which prevail in the
litigation.
Finally, any rights to the use of water vested prior to the time that
the Winters Doctrine Rights were withdrawn must, of course, be recognized
and must be protected against invasion by the national government in
the same manner as any other private property rights.
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